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Of the Internal Revenue Code
By ALAN GUNN
According to the author, a minor problem
in partnership taxation provides a useful
illustration of the problem of following the
language of the Internal Revenue Code
slavishly, without regard to context and
history, even if a literal reading leads to
absurd results. Alan Gunn is J. duPratt White
Professor of Law at Cornell Law School,
Ithaca, New York.
@ 1984, Alan Gunn
My wife tells me that I am undergoing a
mid-life crisis. To prove this, she observes that
until a few years ago I wore only plain white
underwear, but that now I wear some with
stripes, and even checks. According to a maga-
zine article,' a sudden change from plain to color-
ful underwear is a recognized symptom of mid-
life nuttiness. In a feeble effort at self-defense,
I have pointed out that the only reason I have
colored underwear is that my wife herself bought
them for me as a birthday present. This, she
insists, is no defense at all, because the magazine
article listed wearing colored underwear, not buy-
ing it, as a symptom.
I hasten to note that the analysis described
in the previous paragraph is an example of what
passes for humor in my family. Any rational
person would realize that the magazine's ref-
erence to "wearing" must be taken in context as
including only wearing that reflects the wearer's
own taste, and no one would take the magazine's
"test" literally. But what of the language in a
statute? Some commentators, who appear to be
entirely serious, take the position that the lan-
guage of the Internal Revenue Code must be
followed slavishly, without regard to context and
'Unfortunately, this important scientific document






history, even if a literal reading leads to absurd
results. A minor problem in partnership taxation
provides a useful illustration of the problem
itself and of two ways of going astray in dealing
with it.2
Increase in Partner's Basis upon
Contribution of Property to
Partnership
Ordinarily, a partner, recognizes no gain upon
contributing property to a partnership.' There
are, however, two exceptions. The first, which
has been in the 1954 Code since its enactment,
has to do with constructive cash distributions.
Some partnership contributions of mortgaged
property will result in constructive distributions,
and these may cause the contributor to recognize
gain (the details of the process are unimportant
for purposes of this discussion) .4 The second
exception deals with contributions to investment
company partnerships: since 1976, a contributor
of appreciated property to an investment com-
pany partnership has had to recognize the appre-
ciation as gain.'
The question arises whether gain recognized
by a partner upon the contribution of property to
a partnership will be reflected by an increase in
the partner's basis for his partnership interest.
If we ignore the statute for the moment and
think about what makes sense, the answer is
clear. Gain recognized because of a constructive
distribution associated with the contribution of
encumbered property should not trigger an in-
crease in basis, because increasing the basis will
in most cases lead to the contributor's taxable
income being less than his economic income by
the amount of the increase.6 In the case of gain
recognized when appreciated property is con-
tributed to an investment company partnership,
however, an increase in the partner's basis for
his partnership interest is needed to prevent
double taxation. Everyone who has considered
the matter in print agrees with these conclusions.'
Section 722: Congressional Intent
v. Statutory Language
\What does the statute say about increases
in basis? From 1954 until 1976-a period in which
the only gain recognized upon contributions to
partnerships was gain from constructive distribu-
tions-the statute did not provide for basis in-
creases. In 1976, when Congress made contributions
of appreciated property to investment company
partnerships taxable, Section 722 was amended
to provide that the basis of a partner's interest
in a partnership is increased by "the amount (if
any) of gain recognized to the contributing part-
ner" at the time of the contribution.
If violence was not to be done to fundamen-
tal principles of taxation, the reference in Section
722 to "gain recognized to the contributing part-
ner" had to be read as being limited to gains
recognized because appreciated property was
contributed to an investment company partner-
ship. The plausibility of this reading is enhanced
by the legislative history of the basis-increase
requirement, which was adopted as a "conform-
ing amendment" when transfers of appreciated
property to investment company partnerships
were made taxable for the first time. Commen-
tators agree that the drafters of the 1976 amend-
ment to Section 722 intended to provide for basis
increases only in cases involving contributions
to investment company partnerships. One treatise,
for example, calls this conclusion "logical and
reasonable, if not inevitable," and concedes that
there is "no good . . . reason" for the results that
would be reached if basis increases under Section
'Section 722(f) of the Tax Reform, Act of 1984,
H. R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), has now re-
solved the partnership-taxation problem discussed in
this article. But the more fundamental issue-whether
the statute must always be read literally-remains.
' 1. R. C. Sec. 721.
'Under I. R. C. Sec. 752, the partner is treated as
having received a cash distribution in the amount by
which his liabilities are reduced when the encumbered
property is contributed. The amount of this construc-
tive cash distribution first reduces the partner's basis
for his partnership interest. I. R. C. Sec. 733. If the
amount of the distribution exceeds the basis of the part-
ner's interest "immediately before" the distribution, the
excess is treated as a gain from the sale or exchange of
the partner's interest in the partnership. I. R. C. Sec.
731 (a).
I. R. C. Sec. 721(b). The term "investment com-
pany partnership" is used here to mean a partnership
that would be an investment company as defined in
I. R. C. Sec. 751 if the partnership were a corporation.
' For examples illustrating this point, see 1 A. Willis,
J. Pennell & P. Postlewaite, Partnership Taxation § 24.03
(3d ed. 1981), and Jones, "Increase in Basis May Still
Be Available After Revenue Ruling 84-15," 62 TAXES-
The Tax Magazine 515 (August, 1984).
' Ibid. A somewhat similar issue is whether the basis
of contributed property should -be increased by the
amount of gain recognized. Increasing the basis of
contributed property does not lead to an absurd result,
even if the gain in question results from a constructive
distribution. See Jones, supra note 6, at 519-20. How-
ever, the structure and history of the partnership pro-
visions suggest very strongly that contributed property
should receive a basis increase on account of a con-
structive distribution only if a Section 754 election is in
effect. The 1984 amendments make this clear.
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722 were applied across the board.8 A recent
article in this journal took a similar lineY
Nevertheless, both of these authorities argue
that the language of Section 722 (before its
amendment in 1984) compelled a basis increase
whenever the contributing partner recognized
gain. The language of the statute, we are told,
is "clear and unambiguous," and so, "logically,"
that language must be followed literally, despite
the absurdity of the result. 10
"Literal" Meaning.-Why should the "literal"
meaning of a statute be followed if the result
will be a perversion of the goals of the legisla-
ture that enacted the statute? In everyday life,
that kind of wooden preference for words over
common sense would be regarded as a symptom
of serious mental incapacity. Let us suppose, for
example, that one of the commentators, upon
leaving his office to catch a plane for Hawaii,
tells his secretary that he is expecting an im-
portant letter from the Internal Revenue Service
and instructs her to send the letter on to his hotel
in Hawaii as soon as it comes in. The letter
arrives, and the secretary puts it in a new enve-
lope, addressed to the commentator in Hawaii.
Just as she is about to drop the letter down the
mail chute, she learns that a sudden storm has
closed the airport and that no flights will leave
that day. Now the secretary, who knows that
the commentator will return to the office before
going to Hawaii, has a choice: She can follow
the "clear and unambiguous" language of her
instructions and mail the letter, or she can take
account of the commentator's reason for telling
her to mail the letter and hold it for him. What
should she do? If she does mail the letter, will
the commentator's annoyance be allayed by the
secretary's telling him that his instructions were
"clear and unambiguous" and that her actions
were "logical"?
"Plain Meaning" Interpretations.-The prob-
lem boils down to this: Why do people think that
a federal judge, in applying a statute, should
exercise less judgment and intelligence than one
would normally expect from one's secretary?
The only answer suggested by the commentators
is that our traditional assignment of responsibilities
to legislatures and courts demands woodenness
in applying "clear" legislation. One commenta-
tor, for example, invokes a "general rule of statu-
tory interpretation" to the effect that "legislative
history is to be examined only if the statutory
language is unclear." 11 This is simply not true.
In 1940, the Supreme Court held in United States
v. American Trucking Assns 12 that the purpose
of the statute, not its "literal words," must be
followed when the "plain meaning" leads to
results that are absurd or "plainly at variance
with the policy of the legislation as a whole."
To be sure, one still finds appeals to "plain
meaning" in the Supreme Court's tax opinions,
but these appeals are always accompanied by
attempts to show that the "plain meaning" in-
terpretation corresponds to the policies under-
lying the statute in question. 3 There are no
modern Supreme Court tax opinions-and very
few, if any, from lower courts-in which the
writer of the opinion concedes that the result
for which he argues would be absurd and not
intended by Congress, but nevertheless insists
that the result is required by the "clear" lan-
guage of the statute. 4 One has only to consider
the liquidation-reincorporation cases,1 for ex-
ample, to appreciate how far removed our tax
system is from one in which the Code is inter-
preted literally.
Underlying the insistence upon "plain mean-
ing" interpretations at all costs may be a fear
that some courts may substitute their own judg-
ments about tax policy for those of the legisla-
ture if judges are allowed the slightest latitude
in interpretation This is a legitimate concern,
but insistence that judges follow the words of
the statute rather than the plain intention of
Congress in cases in which these differ would be
an unsatisfactory deterrent even if the courts
could be persuaded to adopt it. The whole point
of legislative supremacy is, after all, that the
decisions of Congress should not be undermined
by judges; the risk that courts may misread the
'1 A. Willis, J. Pennell & P. Postlewaite, supra
note 6, at § 24.03.
'Jones, supra note 6, at 518-19.
1 A. Willis, J. Pennell & P. Postlewaite, supra
note 6, at § 24.03; Jones, supra note 6, at 517-18. Mr.
Jones is somewhat less insistent than the authors of
the Willis book about the inevitability of the "plain
meaning" interpretation; his principal argument seems
to be that taxpayers would be justified in taking a
"plain meaning" approach on their returns.
1I A. Willis, J. Pennell & P. Postlewaite, supra
note 6, at § 24.03.
"2310 U. S. 534, 543, rehearing denied, 311 U. S. 724
(1940).
"3 See, e. g., Badarocco v. Commissioner, 84-1 USTC
ff 9150, 104 S. Ct. 756 (1984).
" For an example of a court of appeals decision
refusing to follow "plain language" on the ground that
doing so would produce a result that no rational Con-
gress could have intended, see J. C. Penney Co. v. Com-
nissioner, 63-1 USTC 19129, 312 F. 2d 65 (CA-2)
(Friendly, J.).
" E. g., Reef Carp. v. Commissioner, 66-2 usTc 1 9716,
368 F. 2d 125 (CA-5).
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intentions of the legislature hardly justifies their
ignoring those intentions when they are clear.
Furthermore, if the courts were to begin giving
the Code a "plain meaning" interpretation, Con-
gress would constantly have to amend the Code
to bring its precise language into line with its
aims, and the inevitable result would be a tax
statute even less comprehensible than the one
we have now. (Readers who doubt this are
invited to read a section-almost any section-of
the British tax statute, which is, for the most
part, interpreted quite literally by the British
courts.)
Revenue Ruling 84-15
The IRS's response to the problem of basis
increases upon contributions to partnerships was
Revenue Ruling 84-15,16 which reached the con-
clusion that basis should be increased under
Section 722 only in cases of transfers to invest-
ment company partnerships. This, as noted above,
is the only sensible result. Unfortunately, the
IRS's explanation for its conclusion is at least
as foolish as the "plain meaning" argument. It
is hard to believe that the IRS had any reason
for issuing Revenue Ruling 84-15 other than a
conviction that Section 722 should be given a
sensible, practical interpretation. One scans the
text in vain for any acknowledgement of this,
however, for nowhere in the ruling is there any
discussion of the benefits of one interpretation
over the other. 7 Instead, one finds metaphysics:
gain recognized on account of a constructive
distribution arising from the contribution of
mortgaged property is, we are told, gain recog-
nized "after" the contribution, rather than "at
the time of" the contribution. Therefore, accord-
ing to the IRS, the language of Section 722 pre-
cludes its application to gains other than those
recognized when appreciated property is con-
tributed to an investment partnership. The in-
anity of this argument becomes apparent when
one tries to assign a specific period of time
(10 seconds? 1/1000 of a second?) 18 to the gap
between the contribution and the recognition of
gain. There may be a touch of poetic justice in
responding to a hyper-technical reading of the
statute with an even more technical argument
based on time differences between real contribu-
tions and imaginary (i. e., "constructive") dis-
tributions, but in the long run this kind of concept
mongering will not further the cause of sensible
interpretation. What was needed was a straight-
forward appeal to common sense, to the legisla-
tive purpose, and to our longstanding history of
interpreting statutes to further their intended
purposes.
Conclusion
The specific problem of basis adjustments
associated with gains on contributing property
to partnerships has now been resolved by statute:
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 amended Section
722 (retroactively to 1976) to "clarify" ' 19 the
inapplicability of the basis-increase rule to gains
arising from constructive distributions. But no
amount of drafting will make the Code interpre-
tation-proof: similar problems have arisen and
will continue to arise in other areas of taxation.
It is curious that tax lawyers, who deal every
day with the interpretation of statutes, should
be so out of touch with modern views of legal
interpretation. Over a hundred years ago, Chris-
topher Columbus Langdell responded to an argu-
ment that a particular principle of contract law
would lead to "unjust" and "absurd" results by
calling the argument "irrelevant. ' 20 Today,
Langdell's writings are used as models of how not
to think about legal problems. That Langdellian
arguments are still put forward by tax commen-
tators does not reflect well upon the tax bar.21 0
I. R. B. 1984-4, 8 (January 23, 1984).
Although the ruling says nothing about the ad-
vantages of a nonliteral interpretation, it does cite the
legislative history of Section 722.
" On the importance of being specific in discussing
time, see Einstein, "Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter
K6rper," 17 Annalen der Physik 891 (1905).
" H. R. Rept. No. 98-861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at
1226 (1954) (Conference Committee Report).
" See L. Fuller & M. Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law
408-09 (4th ed. 1981), quoting C. Langdell, Summary of
the Law of Contracts 15, 20-21 (2d ed. 1880).
" The fundamental point made by this article is far
from new; my object in writing this has been to remind
tax lawyers of something too easily forgotten. For
earlier and more extensive work along the same lines,
see Brown, "The Growing 'Common Law' of Taxation,"
1961 University of Southern California Tax Institute,
1, and Eisenstein, "Some Iconoclastic Reflections on
Tax Administration," 58 Harvard Law Review 477 (1945).
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